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Private Value Determinations and the 
Potential Effect on the Future of Research 
and Development 
Amy L. Landers* 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the promise of an emerging patent market is 
thought to provide future benefits to invention, innovation, and 
the public, this Article examines the possibility that the 
aggregate influence of this activity could instead destabilize 
patent values in a manner that mirrors the “bubble” phenomenon 
that occurred in certain markets in the past. To the extent that 
this occurs, this would have negative consequences for the future 
of investment in research, development, and innovation.1  
Although a patent market has been said to be in the 
emerging stages, none exists at this time.2 The attributes of a 
well-functioning market are not present, including accepted 
methods for determining price, a system to connect 
buyers/licensees with sellers/licensors, liquidity, and minimal 
transaction costs. If such a market becomes established, it might 
lead to rational private ordering for intellectual property asset 
trades. In theory, such a market might facilitate information 
sharing, collaboration, commercialization, and invention. Yet 
there are reasons to consider that a socially desirable market 
might not materialize as anticipated. 
 
 * Professor of Law, Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law. 
 1 Based on the current state of available information, it is not possible to fully 
evaluate whether there is an overall distortion for patent licensing. At present, there is 
only interstitial pricing information available. Patent assertion entities do not disclose 
specifics, license agreements are largely confidential, and there are few comparators. 
Indeed, it appears that some entities go to great lengths to shield the confidentiality of the 
terms of these agreements. See Patrick Anderson, Micron Retains Interest in Round Rock 
Patent Monetization Proceeds, GAMETIME IP (May 9, 2012), http://gametimeip.com/2012/ 
05/09/micron-retains-interest-in-round-rock-patent-monetization-proceeds.  
 2 See Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 257 (2007); see also Lucia Karina Alvarado, The Patent Transactions 
Market – Established and Emerging Business Models 7 (2010) (Master’s thesis, Chalmers 
University of Technology) (on file with Department of Technology Management and 
Economics, Chalmers University of Technology).  
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As Hyman Minsky has theorized, some markets become 
subject to a form of instability that leads to incoherence.3 This 
might occur even in the absence of any mismanagement, fraud, 
or wrongful conduct. Damaging volatility can occur due to 
frictions, which can include that which exists between the private 
wealth-maximizing interests of individuals on one hand, and the 
public interest on the other. Further, the impact of such 
incoherence can create second-order effects that reach outside the 
core activity in which this incoherence occurs. This can take any 
of numerous forms, up to and including impacts that harm 
employment, invention, investment, and innovation. 
First, this Article draws on the existing literature to 
establish a working definition of bubbles, both economic and 
non-economic. Second, these principles are applied to the case of 
Bitcoin to illustrate how these theories might be applied to an 
asset that lacks widely accepted, objective price anchors. Third, 
this work considers how these principles might be applied to an 
emerging market for patents. 
I. THE IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE OF BUBBLES 
A.  Economic Bubbles: A Brief Primer 
The field of neoclassic economics assumes that agents are 
rational and markets are efficient. Under this theory, 
well-informed arbitragers correct mispricing when it occurs.4 In 
this theoretical world, the individual pursuit of self-interest is 
said to best serve the public interest by maximizing welfare.5 
Under economic theory, the price of an asset has a rational 
connection to future cash flows, subject to reasonable variations.6 
The behavior that is responsible for bubbles is at odds with these 
assumptions. Episodes that range from the Dutch tulip mania in 
the 1630s up to the recent bursting of the subprime mortgage 
market shed doubt on the idea that the rationality assumption 
can be applied to all markets. To explain this behavior, 
economists have turned to psychology, sociology, and political 
 
 3 See HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 11 (2008). 
 4 See Dilip Abreu & Markus K. Brunnermeier, Bubbles and Crashes, 71 
ECONOMETRICA 173 (2003). 
 5 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Invisible Hand and Modern Welfare Economics 1 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3641, 1991). The field of economics’ limited 
sphere of influence on the operation of the law has been explored by others. See, e.g., 
Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 
103−40 (1979).  
 6 See Jeremy J. Siegel, What Is an Asset Price Bubble? An Operational Definition, 
9 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 11, 12 (2003); see also PETER M. GARBER, FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES: THE 
FUNDAMENTALS OF EARLY MANIAS 4 (2000). 
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science to formulate a literature that examines the bubble 
phenomenon.  
The richest source of this literature focuses on the pricing 
bubble, which is defined as “an upward price movement over an 
extended [range] . . . that then implodes.”7 An alternative 
definition holds that bubble pricing is “a sharp rise in [the] price 
of an asset or a range of assets in a continuous process, with the 
initial rise generating expectations of further rises and attracting 
new buyers—generally speculators interested in profits from 
trading in the asset rather than its use or earning capacity.”8 The 
key points of commonality underlying these descriptions is that a 
bubble occurs when the price of the asset is higher than justified 
by its intrinsic value when referenced against its underlying 
fundamentals. For a typical commodity, fundamental price 
drivers might include supply scarcity, increased demand, 
changes in consumer income levels, overall consumer confidence, 
and employment levels. In contrast, bubble asset prices are 
driven by the irrational expectation that the asset’s price will 
continue to rise merely because prices have done so in the past. 
As an example, “[d]uring a housing price bubble, homebuyers 
think that a home that they would normally consider too 
expensive for them is now an acceptable purchase because they 
will be compensated by significant further price increases.”9 If 
the home is resold, this anticipation drives the sales price 
upward. Where these expectations are prevalent within a 
substantial portion of the market, all home prices rise. Where 
prices consistently and significantly depart above a level that can 
be sustained in the long term, in the absence of an alternative 
explanation, a bubble exists. Inevitably, the supply of buyers that 
are willing or able to pay ever-increasing prices disappears. 
Bubbles can form if buyers are willing to pay an increase 
based on the mere expectation of turning a profit through 
resale.10 In the end, these successive price increases are revealed 
to be unsustainable, for example when “people buy houses 
because they expect home prices to keep rising at a pace that 
would eventually leave nobody able to buy a first home.”11 Such 
cycles cannot manifest profits over the long term, because these 
 
 7 CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND 
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISES 29 (5th ed., 2005). 
 8 1 PALGRAVE MACMILLIAN, THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 281 
(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1998).  
 9 Karl E. Case & Robert J. Shiller, Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market?, 
2003 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, no. 2, at 299, 299. 
 10 See id. 
 11 Paul Krugman, Things that Aren’t Bubbles, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2012, 9:54 AM), 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/22/things-that-arent-bubbles. 
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circumstances are akin to the final phase of a Ponzi scheme, 
where the pricing structure is doomed to collapse when the 
supply of buyers disappears. Certainly, a bubble is not formed 
simply because of a dramatic price increase. As economists 
Kindleberger and Aliber explain, a sharp rise in oil prices based 
on legitimate concerns over political instability in the Middle 
East is an increase driven by anticipated scarcity, which is a 
legitimate price driver.12 Even if the oil shortage never 
materializes, the price rise is not considered subject to bubble 
pricing because the initial concern is a traditional price driver.13  
If markets are populated with rational actors, why do 
bubbles occur? Economist Robert J. Shiller, who coined the 
phrase “irrational exuberance,” proffers this explanation:  
[It is] a situation in which news of price increases spurs investor 
enthusiasm, which spreads by psychological contagion from person to 
person, in the process amplifying stories that might justify the price 
increases and bringing in a larger and larger class of investors, who, 
despite doubts about the real value of an investment, are drawn to it 
partly through envy of others’ successes and partly through a 
gambler’s excitement.14 
As one source described, “There is nothing as disturbing to one’s 
well-being and judgment as to see a friend get rich. Unless it is to 
see a non-friend get rich.”15 The apparent success stories of the 
early entrants, sometimes spread through the media, help fuel 
others’ interest in participating.16 Yet the circumstances that 
create bubbles are challenging to specify. Although Shiller’s 
assessment seems to ring true in numerous examples of past 
bubble markets, others have formed despite the presence of 
buyer optimism.17 
 
 12 See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND 
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 14 (6th ed., 2011). 
 13 See GARBER, supra note 6, at 124 (“Before we relegate a speculative event to the 
fundamentally inexplicable or bubble category . . . we should exhaust the reasonable 
economic explanations.”). 
 14 ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 2 (2nd ed. 2005); see also 
KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 30 (describing the actions of speculators in 
“irrational exuberance” and how speculation leads “from normal, rational behavior 
to . . . ‘mania’ or a ‘bubble’”). 
 15 KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 30 (quoting JAMES B. STEWART, DEN 
OF THIEVES 97 (1992)). 
 16 See SHILLER, supra note 14, at 105 (“[T]he news media are fundamental 
propagators of speculative price movements through their efforts to make news 
interesting to their audience.”).  
 17 See generally Jörg Oechssler, Carsten Schmidt & Wendelin Schnedler, On the 
Ingredients for Bubble Formation: Informed Traders and Communication, 35 J. ECON. 
DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1831 (2011). “[B]ubbles occur even in a very austere environment 
without any of the features mentioned by Shiller.” Jörg Oechssler et al., On the 
Ingredients for Bubble Formation: Informed Traders and Communication 2 (University of 
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Where it exists, irrational exuberance does not have to be 
uniform across an entire population to fuel a bubble’s creation. 
Mispricing can be attributed to those who “generally seem to 
form expectations by extrapolating past price patterns and by 
myopically updating these expectations based on their own 
forecast errors in the previous period or market.”18 However, 
other participants include sophisticated sources that “understand 
the [asset’s] fundamental value, but speculate on being able to 
resell assets they own for a price in excess of fundamental 
value.”19 These participants, who are aware of the pricing 
vulnerabilities, remain in the market to ride the bubble to 
extract profits as long as possible, hoping to exit prior to the 
crash.  
Thus, certain bubble markets are populated with two types 
of investors: insiders and outsiders.20 According to this theory, 
“[t]he insiders destabilize by driving the price up and then sell at 
or near the top to the outsiders.”21 Yet timing one’s exit is 
notoriously difficult, even for those with experience. As one 
veteran manager of an $8.2 billion fund responded, when asked 
the reasons that he failed to exit the Internet stock bubble earlier 
than he did, “We thought it was the eighth inning, and it was the 
ninth.”22  
Further, economist Edward Miller points out that, under 
certain circumstances, a mere difference of opinion about an 
asset’s valuation can be sufficient to skew prices off of a rational 
fundamental mark.23 Although the reasons are complex, at a 
general level optimists prefer to invest despite high prices, 
because such buyers anticipate further growth.24 Those with 
rational expectations, or pessimistic ones, decline to invest at all. 
Miller theorizes that this imbalance of preferences among buyers 
and sellers leads the asset to become overvalued because the 
 
Heidelberg, Working Paper, 2007), available at http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/md/awi/pro 
fessuren/with2/oss.pdf. 
 18 Stefan Palan, A Review of Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Asset Markets, 
27 J. ECON. SURVEYS 570, 574 (2013); see also Abreu & Brunnermeier, supra note 4, at 
173. 
 19 Palan, supra note 18, at 575; see also Abreu & Brunnermeier, supra note 4, at 174. 
 20 KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 46. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Abreu & Brunnermeier, supra note 4, at 175 (quoting Stanley Druckenmiller, 
manager of George Soros’s fund). 
 23 See Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 
1151, 1155 (1977); see also Oechssler, Schmidt & Schnedler, supra note 17, at 1832 
(demonstrating that the mere possibility that some traders have superior information to 
others can create an adequate environment for bubble formation). 
 24 Some conditions that must be present include short sale constraints and 
circumstances wherein the entire supply of the security can be absorbed by a number of 
optimistic purchasers.  
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prices reflect the preference of the optimists without the 
countervailing balance that pessimists would otherwise provide.  
B.  The Pricing Bubble Trajectory 
Bubbles have been said to follow a characteristic timeline.25 
Typically, the process starts with some type of trigger or 
“displacement” of a magnitude sufficient to affect at least one 
sector of the economy. This might be a new innovation, a new 
asset class, or other event that creates the apparent opportunity 
for profit.26 At first, the new opportunity may operate in the 
market like any other commodity. However, unlike more stable 
assets, those subject to bubble behavior can experience a rise in 
prices or expansion of the opportunity, as an increasing number 
of persons become speculators, resellers, or otherwise engaged in 
supporting the opportunity.27 The larger and continued 
engagement drives demand and prices upwards toward the 
unsustainable level.28 
Shiller suggests that a “new economy” mindset appears to be 
widely prevalent during bubble periods.29 That is, people appear 
to be more optimistic, believe that they are part of a “new era” 
and that “the future is brighter or less uncertain than it was in 
the past.”30 Thus, “speculation is linked with positive economic 
expectations, in particular in new and emerging markets and 
market segments.”31 According to another source, “[t]he 
authorities recognize that something exceptional is happening 
and while they are mindful of earlier manias, ‘this time it’s 
different’, and they have extensive explanations for the 
difference.”32 For the technology stock bubble of the 1990s, there 
was a lottery aspect where some buyers believed that their choice 
stocks were the winners. This masked the fact that all stocks 
were overpriced in the aggregate, because buyers believed in the 
possibility (however remote) that their specific stock pick had the 
probability of becoming the next high performer. Perhaps for this 
reason, in most circumstances, incoherent pricing trends are 
notoriously difficult to identify as problematic until after a crash 
 
 25 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 27–31. 
 26 See id. at 27–29. 
 27 Id. at 30–31. 
 28 Id. at 30. 
 29 SHILLER, supra note 14, at 31. 
 30 Id. at 106. 
 31 Gunther Schnabl & Andreas Hoffmann, Monetary Policy, Vagabonding Liquidity 
and Bursting Bubbles in New and Emerging Markets: An Overinvestment View, 31 WORLD 
ECON. 1226, 1226–27 (2008). 
 32 KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 29. 
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occurs. Indeed, warnings issued by governments have not been 
effective at stopping bubbles.33  
Structural changes can reinforce and facilitate irrational 
transactions. The potential for profit attracts increased capital 
infusion to facilitate purchases.34 New entities and business 
models are created to facilitate transactions and maximize 
return.35 Sub-markets for inputs needed to fuel the buying and 
selling are created, and discussions about process, 
implementation, and strategy become prevalent.36  
For those participating in a bubble market, the cycle of 
buying and selling sustains prices akin to someone riding a 
bicycle because “the rider needs to maintain the forward 
momentum or the bike becomes unstable.”37 At any point, a 
correction might occur, preventing the formation of a full-blown 
bubble.38 However, if the mispricing continues, demand drives 
prices above a level that is justifiable based on the asset’s 
fundamentals.39 At this juncture, the asset’s pricing is vulnerable 
to destabilizing events. Prices at the height of the bubble lack 
rationality, and, therefore, information that affects the mood of 
optimism can cause investors to exit.  
At some point in a typical bubble trajectory, something 
signals and the former confidence suddenly turns to pessimism.40 
The trigger may seem rather inconsequential and irrelevant 
compared to the harm that ultimately occurs when the bubble 
bursts.41 It may be a single company’s failure, an exposure of 
some incidence of fraud, or other occurrence that sheds some 
doubt on the asset’s invulnerability.42 Some have thought that 
the bursting of the Internet stock bubble began with the 
announcement that the research results of the human genome 
project could not be patented.43 This example is remarkable 
 
 33 See Yasushi Asako & Kozo Ueda, The Boy Who Cried Bubble: Public Warnings 
Against Riding Bubbles, 52 ECON. INQUIRY 1137, 1137–38 (2014) (listing examples). 
 34 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 62. 
 35 Cf. id. at 45 (“[T]here was a reversal between the objective and the process, and in 
the end the objective became the process.”). 
 36 See id. at 44–46. 
 37 Id. at 13. 
 38 See George Soros, Remarks at the Festival of Economics, Trento Italy (June 2, 
2012), available at http://www.georgesoros.com/interviews-speeches/entry/remarks_at_the 
_festival_of_economics_trento_italy/. 
 39 Id. (“Eventually the gap between the trend and its biased interpretation grows so 
wide that it becomes unsustainable.”). 
 40 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 84–85. 
 41 Markus K. Brunnermeier & Martin Oehmke, Bubbles, Financial Crises, and 
Systemic Risk, in 2B HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1221, 1245 (G.M. 
Constantinides et al. eds., 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103814. 
 42 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 32–33. 
 43 Brunnermeier & Oehmke, supra note 41, at 1245. 
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because investments in communication and biotechnology arise 
from entirely different economic sectors. Indeed, this example 
demonstrates the fragile nature of bubbles and their irrational 
foundations. 
As one source describes, as the bubble deflates, “expectations 
change slowly at some times and rapidly at others as various 
groups realize – sometimes at different moments and at other 
times more or less simultaneously – that the current forecasts of 
prices and values in the distant future differ from earlier views of 
these same prices and values.”44 The prices existent during the 
bubble period, lacking the necessary rational connection to 
fundamental price drivers, cannot be sustained. Speculation, 
funding sources, and optimistic buyers dissipate, sometimes to 
the vanishing point. If the price fall is rapid, market prices 
destabilize too quickly for appropriate corrections to occur.45 
The effect of this destabilization might be confined to 
speculators, who must shoulder own their private losses. 
However, some crashes introduce feedback into an entire market, 
or even beyond. For example, the Internet stock bubble burst so 
rapidly that the Dow Jones Internet Index lost over half of its 
value in a single month.46 Ultimately, the bursting of the 
Internet stock bubble impacted confidence in stocks in general.47  
The housing bubble, and the related inflated activity in the 
subprime mortgage market, of the first decade of the 2000s led to 
a sustained financial crisis and was felt in nearly every sector of 
the U.S. economy. Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board Alan Greenspan explained that the crisis was triggered by 
bundled and securitized assets comprised of mortgages that were 
“supported by unrealistically positive rating designations by 
credit agencies,” and later required central banks and 
governments “to take unprecedented measures.”48 The ensuing 
crash negatively impacted housing, manufacturing, credit, 
employment, securities, and consumer confidence levels.49 The 
 
 44 KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 84. 
 45 Soros, supra note 38 (“Bubbles are usually asymmetric in shape: booms develop 
slowly but the bust tends to be sudden and devastating. That is due to the use of 
leverage: price declines precipitate the forced liquidation of leveraged positions.”). 
 46 SHILLER, supra note 14, at 128. 
 47 Id. at 130. 
 48 The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the 
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 12, 15 (2008) (testimony of Alan 
Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board) [hereinafter Greenspan 
Testimony]. 
 49 See generally William Poole, Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of 
2007–2009, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421 (2010); Adam Shell, Lehman Bros. Collapse 
Triggered Economic Turmoil, ABCNEWS.COM, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/lehman-
bros-collapse-triggered-economic-turmoil/story?id=8543352 (last visited Mar. 12, 2015). 
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crisis is said to have led to the loss of eight million U.S. jobs.50 
European markets were affected. Further, the impact may have 
precipitated a paradigm shift in the field of economics to 
accommodate the study of aggregate volatility.51 These 
circumstances have triggered broad questions about the extent 
that markets might justifiably rely on the self-interest of 
rational, private actors to ensure market stability.52 In the words 
of Alan Greenspan, “a critical pillar to market competition and 
free markets[] did break down.”53 
In the financial sector, governmental intervention or a 
lender of last resort can cabin the influence of a bubble’s burst. 
Other efforts can limit the impact, such as setting a price floor or 
temporarily halting transactions. According to Minsky, the need 
for such efforts should not be surprising because, as a capitalist 
economy that depends on the pursuit of private profit for 
economic growth, there are “inherent and inescapable flaws that 
lead to intermittent financial instability.”54 One critical question 
is whether there are measures that might be taken to minimize, 
or remedy, the instability before it occurs. If there are not, then 
the next question is whether its effects can be cabined. 
C.  Examples of Non-monetary Bubbles 
The foregoing discussion of bubble behavior has been applied 
to matters other than price. For example, economist Paul 
Krugman describes a construction boom as an asset bubble 
“driven by rapid growth in an area’s population and employment” 
in which the main growth driver is “the local construction boom, 
which will eventually collapse when enough houses are 
completed.”55 In this circumstance, the growth is fueled by 
irrational expectations that cannot be met because they are not 
based on true fundamental drivers of housing starts. Rather, the 
housing sales are essentially a “natural Ponzi scheme[]” based on 
the impossible assumption that the future pricing will 
necessarily echo the past.56  
Political scientist Moshe Maor describes “policy bubbles,” 
which are defined as a non-proportional policy response to an 
 
 50 Poole, supra note 49, at 439. 
 51 See Daron Acemoglu, The Crisis of 2008: Structural Lessons for and from 
Economics, CENTRE FOR ECON. POL’Y RES., Jan. 2009, at 1, 1–2. 
 52 Greenspan Testimony, supra note 48, at 45 (“I made a mistake in presuming that 
the self-interest of organizations, specifically banks and others, were such is that they 
were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms.”). 
 53 Id. 
 54 MINSKY, supra note 3, at 44. 
 55 Krugman, supra note 11. 
 56 Id.  
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existing problem.57 Specifically, these can occur when under the 
existing state of knowledge there is “a real and/or perceived 
policy overreaction that is reinforced by positive feedback over a 
long period of time,”58 characterized by implementation that 
“imposes objective and/or perceived social costs without 
producing offsetting objective and/or perceived benefits.”59 Some 
examples cited by those in the field include privatization for 
infrastructure, government tsars, and perhaps even 
sustainability.60 As Maor explains, people have a tendency to 
“‘fall in love’ with . . . subjectively very attractive ideas or people 
that individuals imagine can satisfy their deepest desires that 
they may only be slightly aware of or not at all.”61 The burst of a 
policy bubble can “wreak havoc on the policy system” in a 
number of ways.62  
Despite their costs, some policy bubbles create positive 
public benefits that are difficult to quantify.63 For example, the 
Human Genome Project and the Apollo space program were 
accomplished when “the large risks that have been undertaken 
individually, politically and financially, leading to a collective 
(individual, public and political) over-enthusiasm” which drove 
them to their completion.64 Under this view, the overall 
dimension and risks of these projects, which can have important 
societal payoffs, are “an essential element in the dynamics of 
important inventions or innovations, and are thus crucial for 
society.”65  
Such bubbles bear some relation to those based on price 
skews. The behavior of buyers (or supporters, in the case of policy 
bubbles) leans toward support of the activity in question. This 
support, because it lacks a connection with the fundamental 
value of the activity, is outsized, irrational, and, in the long term, 
unsustainable. Unless a societal benefit—perhaps 
unquantifiable—is achieved, these non-monetary bubbles can 
have a detrimental impact. 
 
 57 See Moshe Maor, Policy Bubbles: Policy Overreaction and Positive Feedback, 
27 GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. POL’Y ADMIN. & INSTITUTIONS 469 (2014).  
 58 Id. at 470 (emphasis omitted). 
 59 Id.  
 60 Id. at 470–71, 475 (quoting Robert Henry Cox & Daniel Béland, Valence, Policy 
Ideas, and the Rise of Sustainability, 26 GOVERNANCE 307 (2013)). 
 61 Id. at 475.  
 62 Id. at 476 (acknowledging the need for additional modeling). 
 63 See, e.g., Monika Gisler, Didier Sornette & Ryan Woodard, Innovation As a Social 
Bubble: The Example of the Human Genome Project, 40 RES. POL’Y 1412 (2011); Monika 
Gisler & Didier Sornette, Bubbles Everywhere in Human Affairs, SWISS FIN. INST. 1 (RES. 
PAPER SERIES) 10–16 (2010). 
 64 Gisler & Sornette, Bubbles Everywhere in Human Affairs, supra note 63, at 16. 
 65 Id. at 18. 
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D.  Bitcoin’s Bubble Characteristics  
This foregoing discussion outlines the general principles of 
bubbles in both price and non-price contexts. This Article will 
now turn to a discussion of Bitcoin, which media sources have 
already named a bubble.66 As one example, The Economist opined 
that recent Bitcoin price activity “looks like a classic bubble. 
Hoarding means that Bitcoin is currently more of a speculative 
asset than a currency.”67 Economists Alan Greenspan, Robert 
Shiller, and John Quiggen have suggested the same.68 According 
to Quiggen, the lack of the asset’s intrinsic worth suggests that 
holders must depend on appreciation, rather than intrinsic value 
or future income flow.69 For an asset that lacks any intrinsic 
value, any value above the zero mark is not justifiable in the long 
run.70  
Consistent with this explanation, Greenspan has explained 
that Bitcoin’s inability to prove its intrinsic value, is fatal, as 
“[y]ou have to really stretch your imagination to infer what the 
intrinsic value of Bitcoin is. I haven’t been able to do it. Maybe 
somebody else can.”71 Both Norway and Finland have been 
reported to categorize Bitcoin as a commodity, rather than a 
currency.72 According to the head of oversight at the Bank of 
Finland, Bitcoin cannot be considered as a currency because 
there is no issuer that is responsible, and that its “changes in 
value are totally unregulated and very vulnerable to news, 
speculation and hoaxes.”73 If it is true that Bitcoin’s value is 
significantly higher than warranted by its underlying 
fundamentals, the asset is exhibiting classic bubble 
characteristics. 
 
 66 See The Bitcoin Bubble, ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 2013, at 13, available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21590901-it-looks-overvalued-even-if-digital-curr 
ency-crashes-others-will-follow-bitcoin; Tim Worstall, Yes, of Course Bitcoin Is Showing 
Bubble Behaviour, FORBES (Nov. 19, 2013, 1:48 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tim 
worstall/2013/11/19/yes-of-course-bitcoin-is-showing-bubble-behaviour/. 
 67 The Bitcoin Bubble, supra note 66. 
 68 See Robert J. Shiller, In Search of a Stable Electronic Currency, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
1, 2014, at BU4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/business/in-search-of-a-
stable-electronic-currency.html; John Quiggin, The Bitcoin Bubble and a Bad Hypothesis, 
NAT’L INT., Apr. 16, 2013, at 3, available at http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-
bitcoin-bubble-bad-hypothesis-8353; Jeff Kearns, Greenspan Says Bitcoin a Bubble 
Without Intrinsic Currency Value, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 4, 2013, 2:37 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-04/greenspan-says-bitcoin-a-bubble-without-intr 
insic-currency-value.html.  
 69 Quiggin, supra note 68 (“Bitcoin is perhaps the finest example of a pure bubble.”). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Kearns, supra note 68. 
 72 Kati Pohjanpalo, Bitcoin Judged Commodity in Finland After Failing Money Test, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Jan. 20, 2014, 4:50 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-
01-19/bitcoin-becomes-commodity-in-finland-after-failing-currency-test. 
 73 Id. 
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As background, Bitcoin is a privately issued currency based 
on a decentralized network.74 Unlike government-issued 
currencies, distribution derives from multiple exchange 
platforms. This virtual currency is not backed by any country or 
economic system. Bitcoin.org asserts that prices are dictated by 
the standard economic principle of supply and demand.75 To 
ensure that the system does not flood the market with Bitcoins, 
rendering the entire sector valueless, scarcity is built into the 
system through temporal limits on the rate at which new 
Bitcoins can be created, as well as an aggregate cap of 
twenty-one million in total.76 It has been observed: “both sellers 
and buyers are building their opinion about a fair price without a 
quantifiable economic anchor or model.”77  
Conventional comparators used by government-issued 
currencies, such as measures against standard currencies, do not 
exist for this virtual currency.78 There are few robust competitors 
to provide parity valuation. On the demand side, the currency 
creates incentives to hoard, which can artificially inflate 
demand.79 One currency expert has reported that Bitcoin price 
increases are trending above its entire future maximum market 
capitalization.80  
Further, one study has shown a correlation between Bitcoin 
price shifts and an increase in media reports about the 
currency.81 This circumstance suggests that prices are being set 
based on subjective perception, and not traditional drivers that 
include supply and demand. This same source found that those 
 
 74 See generally Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, 
BITCOIN.ORG, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 75 FAQ - Bitcoin, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq (last visited Feb. 17, 2015) (“The 
price of a bitcoin is determined by supply and demand.”). 
 76 JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, MERCATUS CTR., BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR 
POLICY MAKERS 6–7 (2013), available at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Brito_Bit 
coinPrimer.pdf.  
 77 Florian Glaser et al., How to Price a Digital Currency? Empirical Insights on the 
Influence of Media Coverage on the Bitcoin Bubble, in TAGUNGSBAND MULTIKONFERENZ 
WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK 2014 (MKWI 2014) 1404, 1408 (2014). 
 78 Id. at 1409. 
 79 See generally Ronald Stiff, Keith Johnson & Khairy Ahmed Tourk, Scarcity and 
Hoarding: Economic and Social Explanations and Marketing Implications, in 2 
ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RESEARCH 203 (1975); Paul Krugman, Golden Cyberfetters, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2011, 12:20 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/07/golden-
cyberfetters/ (“[T]here has been an incentive to hoard the virtual currency rather than 
spending it.”). 
 80 DAVID WOO, IAN GORDON & VADIM IARALOV, BANK OF AM. MERRILL LYNCH, 
BITCOIN: A FIRST ASSESSMENT (2013), available at https://ciphrex.com/archive/bofa-bit 
coin.pdf; see also Krugman, supra note 79. 
 81  Glaser et al., supra note 77, at 1415. Another paper suggests that other demand 
drivers include the novelty of the system and the currency’s global availability. FLORIAN 
GLASER ET AL., BITCOIN – ASSET OR CURRENCY? REVEALING USERS’ HIDDEN INTENTIONS 5 
(2012), available at http://ecis2014.eu/E-poster/files/0917-file1.pdf. 
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who hold Bitcoin appear to have an optimistic bias and hold the 
asset in anticipation of price appreciation.82 Seeking to buy low 
and sell high, those holding the currency appear to be 
anticipating arbitrage for profit to subsequent purchasers. 
Further, according to the European Central Bank, “it can 
justifiably be stated that Bitcoin is a high-risk system” that 
“could collapse if people try to get out of the system and are not 
able to do so because of its illiquidity.”83  
It is well known that Bitcoin pricing is subject to high 
volatility.84 Further, there do not appear to be external market 
correctors or agencies of last resort. Bitcoin does not promise to 
take action to prevent rapid devaluation or to operate as an 
institution of last resort to ensure returns to those who hold 
currency.85 Although it is too early to definitively determine 
whether Bitcoin is subject to bubble pricing in fact, some 
indicators suggest that Bitcoin pricing is not well correlated to 
standard economic principles of supply and demand.86  
II. THE PATENT AS ASSET: THE NEW ECONOMY OF IP  
A.  Patent Valuation and the Monetization Industry 
This Article will turn to examining patent monetization 
activity in light of the foregoing discussion. In doing so, a 
distinction is drawn between the fundamental, statutorily 
defined definition of patent prices and those obtained through 
patent arbitrage. Although patent assertion programs had been 
undertaken in the past in a limited manner, the increases in 
 
 82 See GLASER ET AL., BITCOIN – ASSET OR CURRENCY? REVEALING USERS’ HIDDEN 
INTENTIONS, supra note 81, at 11. 
 83  EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES 27 (2012), available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf.  
 84 See e.g., Greg Bensinger, Will Bitcoin Be Accepted by Paypal?, WALL ST. J. BLOGS 
(Apr. 30, 2013, 4:24 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/04/30/could-paypal-be-on-hori 
zon-for-bitcoin/; BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 76, at 17–18; see also BITCOIN CHARTS, 
http://bitcoincharts.com/charts/bitstampUSD#tgSzm1g10zm2g25zv (last visited Sept. 18, 
2014). 
 85 As Gavin Andresen, a chief scientist at Bitcoin, cautioned, “Bitcoin is an 
experiment. Treat it like you would a promising Internet start-up company: maybe it will 
change the world, but realize that investing your money or time in new ideas is always 
risky.” Gavin Andresen, That Which Does Not Kill Us Makes Us Stronger, GAVINTHINK 
(June 20, 2011, 11:56 AM), http://gavinthink.blogspot.com/2011/06/that-which-does-not-
kill-us-makes-us.html. But see FAQ - Bitcoin: Won’t Bitcoin Fall in a Deflationary Spiral?, 
BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#what-determines-bitcoins-price (last visited Sept. 18, 
2014) (“With a stable monetary base and a stable economy, the value of the currency 
should remain the same.”). 
 86 See The Bitcoin Bubble, supra note 66; Worstall, supra note 66.  
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sophistication, complexity, and volume are comparatively 
recent.87  
This separation parallels the analyses of other assets, which 
consider pricing of the asset as an investment as a distinct 
operation from more traditional functions. Thus, an appropriate 
economic analysis of Bitcoin as an investment is distinct from the 
currency’s fundamental drivers as a currency.88 Similarly, this 
same division is drawn between a home that is priced as a home, 
compared to the home priced as an investment for resale. 
Applying this same distinction, patents priced as legal rights 
under the statutory definition and patents used for monetization 
are viewed separately.  
Unlike the traditional uses of legal rights to vindicate a legal 
harm, patent assertion entities consider court dates as liquidity 
events and patents as assets to be arbitraged.89 In this context, 
patent values are largely determined either privately or through 
litigation awards. Across all sectors, the methodology for setting 
patent values is indeterminate. As one recent survey of in-house 
patent attorneys concluded, “[v]irtually all interviewees 
lamented the fact that no coherent valuation technique exists.”90 
Negotiations between patent monetizers and accused infringers 
lack mutual understandings of a patent’s worth.91 One recent 
survey of patent monetizers concludes that this group believes 
that valuation is one of their largest concerns.92 According to one 
interviewee, the problem of imprecision in patent valuation 
 
 87 SUZANNE S. HARRISON & PATRICK H. SULLIVAN, EDISON IN THE BOARDROOM 
REVISITED 217 (2012) (noting that patent assertion has existed for years but “[w]hat has 
changed recently is the size and scale of the activities”); David L. Schwartz, The Rise of 
Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 380–81 (2012); 
see also Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 
1; Alvarado, supra note 2, at 58 (observing that patent monetization began rising around 
2003). 
 88 See generally Krugman, supra note 79. 
 89 See generally Andrei Hagiu & David Yoffie, Intermediaries for the IP Market 
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-023, 2011). 
 90 Malcolm T. Meeks & Charles A. Eldering, Patent Valuation: Aren’t We Forgetting 
Something? Making the Case for Claims Analysis in Patent Valuation by Proposing a 
Patent Valuation Method and a Patent-Specific Discount Rate Using the CAPM, 9 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 194, 205 (2010); see also Alvarado, supra note 2, at 57 (“[T]he 
tricky part is that the line between what makes each party happy is not clear at all.”). 
 91 Alvarado, supra note 2, at 57 (“From the NPE [non-practicing entities] side, there 
might be too high expectations on the amount asked for the license; and on the side of the 
operating company, there might be unwillingness to pay the rates that the licensing 
company is proposing.”). 
 92 Id. at 66; see also Tomoya Yanagisawa & Dominique Guellec, The Emerging 
Patent Marketplace 14 (OECD Sci., Tech. & Indus., Working Paper No. 2009/09, 2009), 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/218413152254 (“[M]ost [patent monetizers] have 
difficulty in identifying the value of their patents, since the value of a patent is based on a 
number of factors including the breadth of the claims, how widely the patent is already 
being used or will be used in the future, and the ability to enforce the patent.”). 
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“is the mother of them all.”93 Another queried, “[W]hat is the real 
value of a patent? No one knows and the models that have we 
have right now are not mature enough.”94 The circumstance is 
further complicated by the fact that patent valuations change 
from one infringer to another, depending on the nature of the 
use.95  
These quotes are based on the present state of the law, 
where few solid price benchmarks exist and none are likely to 
emerge.96 There are remarkably few market correctors to 
stabilize and guide patent values. One potentially stabilizing 
source of price comparators is jury verdicts, which determine the 
value of the use of a patented technology according to a 
fifteen-factor test that “overloads the jury with factors to consider 
that may be irrelevant, overlapping, or even contradictory.”97 
Verdicts based on the fifteen-factor test, which by their nature 
vary from case to case, are subject to a deferential standard of 
review.98 These standards, such as they are, tolerate a wide 
range of disagreement about valuation. Industry norms may 
provide some comparators, although patent assertion entities do 
not disclose specifics, license agreements are largely confidential, 
and there are few comparators.99 
As previously described, Miller suggests that the existence of 
differences of opinion about an asset’s value is sufficient to skew 
pricing.100 This circumstance is prevalent in patent licensing, 
where price anchors are limited. To the extent that there is price 
competition, it manifests in the form of patent assertion entities 
bidding against each other to obtain the highest-value patents 
from sellers, driving portfolio prices upward to the highest 
bidder.101 Those with pessimistic expectations about this activity 
 
 93 Alvarado, supra note 2, at 66. 
 94 Id.  
 95 Cf. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 
5593609, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (“[A] court should consider the importance of the 
patent . . . to the alleged infringer’s accused products.”). 
 96 See Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating 
Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627 (2010) (outlining the uncertainties 
created by current reasonable royalty calculations and proposing a solution). 
 97 Id. at 628. A patentee can also obtain lost profits from an infringer. As a practical 
matter, because patent monetization entities do not make products, this form of relief is 
unavailable in this context. 
 98 Id. (stating that jury royalty findings made on this complex, multi-factor test are 
“almost entirely immune from scrutiny by either district or appellate judges facing a 
deferential standard of review”). 
 99 It appears that some entities go to great lengths to shield the confidentiality of the 
terms of these agreements. See Anderson, supra note 1.  
 100 See Miller, supra note 23. 
 101 Cf. RPX Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 8 (Mar. 26, 2012) (stating that parties 
within this field, including patent assertion entities, compete for high value patents). 
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would only rarely engage in such competitions to moderate 
pricing discussions.102 
The federal judiciary has manifested deep divisions as to the 
appropriate starting point. For example, Judge Posner’s opinion 
in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. accepted, in principle, that a 
patent lawsuit might yield nominal damages where the 
infringement results in no actual harm to the rights holder.103 In 
essence, Posner’s conclusion rests on the fact that a patentee’s 
failure to demonstrate harm warrants no monetary relief, based 
on nature of the patent right, the Supreme Court’s eBay opinion, 
and the limited power of the federal courts.104 An extension of 
Posner’s viewpoint leads to the inference that licensors who are 
unable to demonstrate more than a mere trespass of their patent 
right are not entitled to any revenue from accused infringers. 
Certainly, this has the profound potential to throw a stake into 
the heart of patent monetization practices. The concept of legal 
harm, like so many legal conclusions, rests on policy choices 
imposed by law. In this sense, monetizers would be required to 
show a legally cognizable harm recognized as such by existing 
legal standards. Specifically, patent monetizers are in the 
business of selling (or licensing) their own injury. If patent 
infringement that is a mere trespass is judicially limited to 
nominal damages, the monetizer’s injury has virtually no 
financial worth. Accused infringers already have “a negative 
preconception of what [patent monetizers] do,” and no rational 
operating company would pay a license fee without the force of 
law behind it.105  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit questioned Posner’s 
conclusion in Apple v. Motorola, and stated that every 
infringement warrants some measure of damages except in the 
very narrowest (and unlikely) circumstances.106 In effect, the 
Federal Circuit’s analysis creates a floor for virtually any valid 
 
 102 An accused infringer may seek to purchase a patent for the lowest possible price. 
However, a bidding war between a monetizer and an accused infringer would prevent 
such a transaction from being consummated at a low price. Under these circumstances, 
an accused infringer has the incentive to bid high to avoid the risk of an adverse judgment 
and transaction costs if the patent is litigated against it. 
 103 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 909–10 (N.D. Ill. 2012), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part and remanded, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 104 See id. 
 105 Alvarado, supra note 2, at 57. 
 106 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (stating that a 
patentee may obtain nominal damages award only where “the defendant considered the 
patent valueless and the patentee would have accepted no payment for the defendant’s 
infringement,” and acknowledging that “it seems unlikely that a willing licensor and 
willing licensee would agree to a zero royalty payment in a hypothetical negotiation, 
where both infringement and validity are assumed”). 
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and infringed patents. By extension, this appellate ruling might 
be read to support the patent monetizer’s business model. This 
disparate view of damages reveals a philosophical difference 
among the jurists about patent values. More broadly, these 
jurists fundamentally disagree over whether a mere trespass of 
the patent right is sufficient to support a damages award. These 
opinions reflect fundamental differences between these jurists 
about the nature of infringement, the Supreme Court’s eBay 
opinion, and the power of the federal courts. Significantly, this 
further demonstrates that any nascent patent market rests on a 
system that might shift theoretically at its most fundamental 
levels. 
B.  Capturing Value in a Knowledge Economy 
At present, rights holders privately manage their intellectual 
property to maximize their competitive advantage and, 
ultimately, revenue. There is no governmental requirement, 
incentive, or suggestion that such practices occur in a manner 
that is consistent with the public interest. Patent monetization 
might be subject to the types of frictions, identified by Minsky, 
that are suitable to create incoherence. As one example—similar 
to the thinking that was prevalent during the tech stock bubble 
of the 1990s—each rights holder may strongly believe that its 
own patent portfolio warrants maximum damages. This 
circumstance has the potential to drive patent prices upward. 
Coupled with the high costs of defense, this activity can lead to 
an end-point wherein the total demand for license fees outstrips 
accused infringers’ willingness or ability to pay. 
The practice of patent monetization has been analogized to 
the creation of a new asset class—that is, “a new alchemy of 
corporate wealth creation in which intellectual property has come 
to play a powerful new role as a strategic asset and competitive 
weapon of enormous value.”107 This viewpoint is typified, among 
other places, by the book Rembrandts in the Attic: Unlocking the 
Hidden Value of Patents (“Rembrandts”), published in 2000, 
which instructed readers on patent monetization strategies.108 
 
 107 KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC: UNLOCKING THE 
HIDDEN VALUE OF PATENTS 43 (2000). 
 108 Id. at 28; see also HARRISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 87, at 96 (discussing 
capturing IP value through monetization strategies). This verbiage is not confined to 
books. For example, Acacia Research Corporation states on its website that its mission is 
to “set[] patents free.” See Patent Licensing Primer, ACACIA RES. CORP., 
http://acaciaresearch.com/how-we-work/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015). Acacia Research 
“work[s] towards . . . providing inventors and organizations with opportunities to unleash 
the untapped potential in patents.” How We Work, ACACIA RES. CORP., 
http://acaciaresearch.com/how-we-work/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).  
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The book quotes former Securities and Exchange commissioner 
Steven Wallman, who explained: “I see this [trend] coming out of 
a change in our economy from one that is industrial-based to one 
that is knowledge-based, where intellectual property, soft assets, 
and other intangibles increasingly make up the bulk of the asset 
base for wealth production in our society.”109 Although Wallman’s 
quotation might be read to encourage companies to increase 
research and development, Rembrandts urged CEOs to take 
advantage of the “current run-up in intellectual asset values” by 
asserting their patents to generate licensing revenue by 
developing strategies that “liberate the untapped value of their 
company’s intellectual assets” and “achieve outsized gains.”110 
Citing several high-profile success stories, the authors described 
non-practicing entity executives who “like to refer to themselves 
as ‘merchant scientists’ who roam the world ‘prowling for great 
ideas to license to deep-pocketed manufacturers.’”111 The work 
describes numerous methods for leveraging “the huge IP asset 
values lying untapped in intellectual property portfolios,” and 
noting that “the value of intellectual property [is] rising by leaps 
and bounds.”112 Such quotes appear to parallel the “new economy 
thinking” identified by Shiller as to bubble creation. In short, 
patent monetization has been viewed as a key opportunity for 
positive financial growth.113  
A web of new business structures has emerged to support 
patent assertion activity. These include intermediaries that rely 
on multiple subsidiaries and funds, as well as entities that 
finance acquisition and enforcement litigation.114 Some assist 
inventors and owners to fine-tune or expand their original 
rights.115 Some assist product companies to defend against 
allegations of patent infringement.116 Educated and expert 
participants populate these new structures. Together, these 
circumstances paint a picture that there is a monetary 
opportunity relating to the patent monetization field.  
 
 109 RIVETTE & KLINE, supra note 107, at 51 (quoting Steven Wallman, former 
Securities and Exchange Commission Commissioner). 
 110 Id. at 124. 
 111 Id. at 132. 
 112 Id. at 144. 
 113 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 27–29. 
 114 See id. at 30–33. 
 115 Acacia Research Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 7–8 (Feb. 25, 2014) (“[W]e 
often assist patent holders with the acquisition of additional rights associated with their 
inventions both in the United States and across the globe.”). 
 116 For an overview of various business structures in the patent monetization space, 
see generally RAYMOND MILLIEN & RON LAURIE, A SUMMARY OF ESTABLISHED AND 
EMERGING IP BUSINESS MODELS 5–6 (2007), available at http://www.concap.cc/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/IP-Business-Models.pdf. 
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Patent arbitrage has reached a large scale that is part of a 
large and complex industry; as one source observes, “the scale 
itself is simply mind-boggling.”117 The amount of capital raised by 
patent assertion entities to operationalize their business plans is 
estimated to be in the billions of dollars.118 Approximations of the 
number of active patent assertion entities vary widely, from 250 
to over 1000.119 By May 2009, the largest had spent over 
$1 billion acquiring patents.120 Another monetizer, Acacia 
Technologies, owns rights to over 200 patent portfolios, either 
directly or through its subsidiaries.121 Although few entities 
disclose numerical details of their operations, it is thought that 
most obtain the majority of their licensing revenue through 
negotiation, rather than litigation.122 The sheer volume of patent 
transactions are notable, and suggest that this activity is 
sufficient to impact patent valuations more broadly.  
High volume patent transfers are reported to rival (or 
exceed) the prices of skyscrapers. One source reports that 
Microsoft obtained a broad license to Acacia Technology’s patents 
for a three-year term for $22.5 million dollars.123 Kodak 
monetized its 1100-patent portfolio to a group of operating 
companies for $525 million.124 In 2012, Acacia spent $150 million 
to acquire a patent portfolio covering 4G wireless technologies.125 
Also that year, another monetizer named Vringo paid Nokia 
$22 million and an ongoing revenue stream for patents essential 
for cell phone data transmission.126  
Today, there is currently a greater quantity of patents 
available for purchase.127 Managers seeking ready cash or a 
revenue stream have marketed patents that have been deemed 
 
 117 Ewing & Feldman, supra note 87, at 2; see also RPX Corp., supra note 101, at 2. 
 118 RPX Corp., supra note 101, at 4; see also Schwartz, supra note 87, at 339 (“While 
historically there has been a small amount of buying and selling of freestanding patents, 
there is substantial evidence that the market for patents has recently grown.”). 
 119 Letter from Noreen Krall, Vice President, Chief Legal Counsel, Apple Corp., to 
Donald S. Clark, Sec’y FTC (Dec. 16, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/public_comments/2013/12/00069-87879.pdf; RPX Corp., supra note 101, 
at 4. 
 120 Nigel Page, IV Shifts Gear, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. MAG., July–Aug. 2009, at 9, 13. 
 121 Acacia Research Corp., supra note 115, at 3. 
 122 Cf. Joff Wild, Star Man, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. MAG., July–Aug. 2013, at 63, 67 
(describing a patent assertion entity’s preference to negotiate, rather than litigate). 
 123 Video Streaming Solutions L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 13 C 7031, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 71739, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2014).  
 124 Andrew Martin, Kodak to Sell Digital Imaging Patents for $525 Million, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2012, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/business/ 
kodak-to-sell-patents-for-525-million.html.  
 125 Acacia Research Corp., supra note 115, at 30. 
 126 Vringo Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 6 (Mar. 21, 2013). 
 127 Schwartz, supra note 87, at 379. 
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unnecessary to protect their companies’ competitive position.128 
There is some evidence that shows that research universities 
have transferred either patents or the rights to future research to 
monetizer Intellectual Ventures.129  
Unlike stocks that are purchased and re-sold to “keep the 
bicycle moving forward to maintain momentum,” the ability to 
recoup the sales price and profit occurs largely through licensing 
or litigating a patent (or a portfolio of related patents). The 
successful innovators are the most frequent and high profile 
targets of this activity.130 In some instances, this may be 
accomplished by finding so-called “undervalued” patents. Yet 
inputs into this market include sophisticated entities.131 
Although it is certainly plausible that some patents sold by these 
experienced entities are undervalued, it is not entirely clear that 
this can occur across the board. Furthermore, the lack of 
valuation benchmarks contributes to patent assertion entities’ 
ability to “buy low, license high” even from well-informed, 
sophisticated patent sellers.  
Some firms have turned a significant profit. For example, 
Acacia Technologies has asserted that it has earned a tripled rate 
of return over a five-year period, and of that it has returned over 
$600 million to its investors.132 During 2013, three publicly 
traded patent monetizers achieved a rate of return better than 
the S&P 500 average.133 Nonetheless, the year-to-year 
performance of these entities has not been steady.134 In part, this 
is because any individual companies’ performance is strongly 
aligned with its litigation calendar.135  
 
 128 Id. at 380. 
 129 Ewing & Feldman, supra note 87, at 7–8. 
 130 Most Pursued Companies, PAT. FREEDOM (July 14, 2014), https://www.patent 
freedom.com/about-npes/pursued/.  
 131 In some reported instances, patent aggregators have re-sold patents to other 
non-practicing entities, which mimics the “keep the bicycle moving forward to maintain 
momentum,” conduct indicative of pricing bubbles. However, it is not clear whether the 
sale prices are higher than the purchase price of these assets, or how widespread this 
practice is.  
 132 See ACACIA RESEARCH CORP., INVESTOR RELATIONS PRESENTATION, Q2 2014, at 8 
(2014), available at http://acaciaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Acacia-Resea 
rch-Presentation-Q214.pdf; ACACIA RESEARCH CORP., INVESTMENT PROFILE JUNE 2014, at 
1 (2014), available at http://acaciaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Acacia-Fact-
Sheet-Q2-2014.pdf.  
 133 Maulin Shah, Stock Performance of Publicly Traded Patent Trolls – A Year in 
Review, PATENTVUE (May 2, 2014, 5:03 PM), http://envisionip.com/blog/2014/05/02/stock-
performance-publicly-traded-patent-trolls-year-review/.  
 134 Id. 
 135 See id. 
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C.  Patent Assertion Pricing Methods and Fundamentals 
The key questions center on whether overall prices within 
this imperfect market bear a reasonable relationship to 
fundamental drivers of patent valuation. To the extent there is a 
significant disconnect, additional issues begin to emerge. These 
include the question of whether a dramatic shift in the patent 
monetization area will affect confidence in the patent system 
more generally. Additionally, to the extent that current licensing 
valuations are skewed, there is a question of whether subsequent 
valuations will continue to rely on such transaction prices as 
comparators in the future. To the extent that this occurs without 
correction, any currently elevated prices can be expected to 
distort any patent market that later develops. 
Anticipated returns on monetization investments are based 
on the ability to recoup the sale price, plus obtain a profit, from 
licensing—in other words, the practice of “buy low, license high.” 
Rational patent monetizers purchase patents at a level that 
anticipates profit to be made through the churning, turnover 
event.136 Yet on its face, this practice violates the one-price rule. 
A patent’s intrinsic characteristics do not change through 
transfer to a patent assertion entity. Objectively, the patent 
claims no more than it did before, and it is no more likely to be 
infringed or valid. The market and its technological context have 
not changed by the mere fact of transfer. Although some 
unsophisticated or distressed sellers may be pricing patents 
below market value, there are some inherent difficulties with 
this explanation. It assumes an accepted foundation for 
calculating royalties that is currently lacking. Additionally, seller 
companies and universities presumably possess access to 
sufficient resources to properly value patents to the extent that 
this is feasible. Even some distressed sellers, including Kodak 
and Nortel, have sold patents to high-profile patent buyers even 
though both companies were in difficult financial circumstances 
at the time of sale.137 One source suggests that patent 
aggregators compete to buy; patents are sold to the highest 
 
 136 Cf. Wild, supra note 122, at 66–67 (describing the goal of the enterprise to 
maximize return on the patents). Notably, each transaction must factor in the cost of 
assertion, including the cost of negotiation or litigation. Dan Levine & Tom Hals, 
Exclusive: Intellectual Ventures Faces Novel Attack on Patent Business, REUTERS, (Oct. 29, 
2013, 7:10 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/29/us-intellectual-ventures-law 
suit-idUSBRE99S05120131029 (describing that a patent acquired for $750,000 by 
Intellectual Ventures warranted damages of $310 million against two infringers). 
 137 Martin, supra note 124, at B3; Peg Brickley, Nortel $4.5-Billion Patent Sale to 
Apple, Microsoft, Others Approved, WALL ST. J., (July 11, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424052702303812104576440161959082234.  
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bidder.138 It cannot be said that all patent monetizer profits are 
attributable to purchasing undervalued patents.  
It has been asserted that patent monetizers add value by 
adding expertise to transaction and litigation activity. Yet such 
activity does not necessarily pull “under-valued” patents to a 
price that reflects fundamental value. Critically, it has been 
reported that licenses are signed at prices necessary to avoid 
litigation costs instead of the patent’s true value.139 As one source 
describes, patent monetization entities appear to “capitalize on 
the poorly functioning patent market” rather than to create a 
well-functioning, efficient one.140 
According to Apple, perhaps the most frequent target of 
patent monetizers, larger companies are asked to pay for patent 
licenses to avoid the cost of defense.141 According to the company, 
“the opening line of many negotiations is some form of, ‘What 
we’re asking for is less than it will cost you to litigate this case to 
judgment.’”142 It has agreed to over fifty settlements, and “the 
threat of fees often forces an undeserved settlement” to avoid the 
high cost of defense.143 Compared with small startups, larger 
companies face big ticket demands, and monetizers “have a 
reputation for surprising the largest and most profitable 
companies with infringement lawsuits just after the 
announcement of a new and important product.”144 
 Based on its experiences, Apple states: “The gap between 
a [patent assertion entity’s patent] acquisition price and its 
ultimate demand suggests that something other than the 
patent’s contribution to innovation and progress is 
 
 138 RPX CORP., supra note 101, at 8 (stating that parties within this field, including 
patent assertion entities, compete for high-value patents). 
 139 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 6 
(June 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_re 
port.pdf (“Given [the high cost to defend against patent claims], many patent owners and 
users prefer to settle out of court for amounts that have not so much to do with the 
economic value of their patents or the probability that they have infringed. Instead, 
settlements are affected more by the parties’ relative opportunity costs of going to trial 
and attitudes towards risk . . . .”); Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup 
Companies: The View from the Venture Capital Community, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236, 
275 (2014) (noting that an offer to settle was based on the observation that a license was 
signed for $1–2 million, in order to avoid $3–5 million in attorney fees to litigate the 
dispute). 
 140 RPX and the Broken Patent Market, PUNCH CARD INVESTING (Oct. 11, 2013), 
http://punchcardblog.wordpress.com/2013/10/11/rpx-and-the-broken-patent-market/.  
 141 Brief of Apple Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2, Octane 
Fitness, L.L.C. v. Icon Health and Fitness, Inc., No. 12-1184 (2014). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Letter from Noreen Krall, supra note 119. 
Do Not Delete 6/6/2015 11:02 AM 
2015] Private Value Determinations 669 
driving . . . patent valuation.”145 If Posner is correct that 
harmless patent infringement warrants nominal damages, then 
the logical baseline for some discussions is close to the nominal 
mark, and not the far higher amount attributable to litigation 
defense costs.146 
The reasons that nuisance settlements work in the short 
term is that any single valid claim that is arguably sufficient to 
encompass a single feature of an innovator’s product creates a 
viable foundation for a lawsuit, together with all of the attendant 
costs and disruptions. The more sophisticated monetizers take a 
portfolio approach to patent acquisition.147 As one source points 
out, “a well-conceived patent portfolio operates much like a 
‘super-patent’; its scale-effects mean that a holder wields 
otherwise-unattainable market power in a particular 
technological field.”148 From the perspective of those accused of 
infringement, these portfolios create a cloud of uncertainty that 
is difficult to permeate. A monetizer that owns thousands of 
patent claims creates an intimidation factor that cannot be 
paralleled by the assertion of a single patent. Weaknesses in one 
patent can be easily overcome with arguments based on any of a 
dozen or so other patents in the portfolio. Under these 
circumstances, “the range of each patent cannot be determined 
without a large investment of time and effort, and any 
pre-litigation predictions about the scope of a patent may prove 
incredibly wrong.”149 
One study reports that small entities are also targets of 
those who are responsible for nuisance demands—that is, 
demands for license payments that are less than the cost of 
defending against the case.150 Because the cost of patent 
litigation can easily reach hundreds of thousands of dollars up to 
millions, patent monetizers can charge a significant fee despite 
the high likelihood that the asserted patent is invalid or 
worthless.151 In one reported instance, patent monetizer Lodsys 
 
 145 Id. 
 146 Generally, the Patent Act requires that royalties be based on the use of the 
invention and track the value of the patent’s contribution over the prior art. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 284 (2012); see also Amy L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, Patentee Injury, and 
Sequential Invention, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 490 (2012).  
 147 Cf. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 6 (2005) (noting that firms will take a portfolio approach to patents). 
 148 Id. at 7. 
 149 Ewing & Feldman, supra note 87, at 25. 
 150 Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 477 
(2014). 
 151  Why Patent Quality Matters, PAT. QUALITY INITIATIVE, http://www.patentquality 
initiative.com/about%20pqi/why%20patent%20quality%20matters (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
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offered small app developers a royalty rate of 0.575% of revenue that 
became due only once the app developer reached a quarterly revenue 
of $10,000. Such settlements in effect would require no money upfront 
from a small developer, but allow Lodsys to advertise that their patent 
was licensed at a certain rate.152 
These agreements, which are attractive to cash-starved 
startups because they avoid any requirement for an early lump 
sum payment, enable the patentee to institute an artificially high 
royalty rate.153 Once a critical mass of licensees has been signed, 
the inflated rate can be used as that patent’s established royalty 
rate against larger companies in both licensing negotiations and 
in court. Any patents of no or low value that have had rates 
artificially inflated from their fundamental value represent price 
skews from their fundamental value. 
Licensing rates that are based on an amount necessary to 
defend against infringement allegations lack a rational 
connection to the fundamental drivers of patent value—that is, 
the value of the patented technology. For patent assertion that 
relies on nuisance settlements, patent pricing is likely to exhibit 
volatility based on factors relating to the rising (or lowering) of 
the cost of defense.154 For these, the strategic uses of patents 
have shifted the focus of the pricing metric to the patent’s 
strategic value, rather than the fundamental value of the claims. 
Additionally, a patent that can be asserted against several 
deep-pocket infringers garners higher prices than those that can 
be asserted against those with fewer financial resources, 
regardless of the fundamental value of the underlying 
technology. In an environment with few objective anchors, these 
circumstances suggest that a bubble-like pattern of price 
optimism in obtaining patents, followed by a pattern of profit 
recovery through assertion, may push patent values from their 
fundamental values.  
Additional research indicates that the monetizer’s ability to 
buy low and license depends on strategies to maximize monetary 
return.155 Monetization most profitably occurs when the accused 
 
 152 Chien, supra note 150, at 478. 
 153 Id. at 477–78 (describing the strategy). 
 154 See Richard Lloyd, Alice Decision a Big Reason for Sharp Fall in US Patent 
Litigation, Says Mark Lemley, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.iam-
magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=dadf4dce-0f75-45dc-9339-dacb0f7bb465 (observing that 
“the value that the patentees can get from the litigation goes down” when fee shifting and 
the probability of a dismissal of a patent case on the pleadings increase). 
 155 For an example, see Axel Haus & Steffen Juranek, Patent Trolls, Litigation, and 
the Market for Innovation 13 (May 15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2424407. For a criticism of findings 
that relate to such targeting, see Ted Sichelman, Are Patent Trolls “Opportunistic”? (San 
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infringer has already invested in the commercialization, 
marketing, service, and support for the accused product. As 
stated by Edith Ramirez, “[p]articularly in the high-tech sector, 
where patent notice is notoriously difficult, licensing fees are 
likely to reflect investments the implementer has made to bring a 
product to market, rather than the true economic value of the 
patent.”156 Higher settlements can be obtained from innovators 
who would otherwise encounter significant cost and disruption to 
redesign the product. Coupled with these practices is the problem 
that it occurs in an environment with only interstitial value 
comparators based on a patent’s true fundamentals.  
It has been reported that monetizers target firms with strong 
cash positions, particularly those with recent cash level 
increases, including revenue sources that are unrelated to any 
use of the technology.157 Additionally, patent assertion is more 
likely to hit “firms that are busy dealing with a number of other 
litigation events unrelated to intellectual property.”158 Further, it 
has been reported that non-practicing entities hold their patents 
until assertion will maximize business disruption, rather than 
seeking to license companies who are in the market for a 
technologically creative design solution.159 Although these 
strategies may fully comport with current law, these tactics tend 
to maximize private revenue rather than to mirror a patent’s 
inherent worth. 
Coupling the lack of comparators with the monetizer’s drive 
to arbitrage suggests that patent pricing is shifting from the 
fundamental value of the technology to the potential recovery 
value from deep pocket infringers that are seeking to guard 
against legal exposure. As some reports indicate, “[t]he dominant 
patent assertion strategy is to leverage certain features of the 
patent system—not the strength of the patent or quality of the 
 
Diego Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 14-175, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2520125. 
 156 Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FTC, Opening Remarks at the Computer 
& Communications Industry Association and American Antitrust Institute 
Program: Competition Law & Patent Assertion Entities: What Antitrust Enforcers Can 
Do 4 (June 20, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/public_statements/competition-law-patent-assertion-entities-what-antitrust-en 
forcers-can-do/130620paespeech.pdf). 
 157 Lauren Cohen, Umit G. Gurun & Scott Duke Kominers, Patent Trolls: Evidence 
from Targeted Firms 2–3 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15-002, 2014), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2464303.  
 158 Id. at 3. 
 159 See Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a 
Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1309, 1313 (2013) (finding that patent monetizers “overwhelmingly wait to assert their 
rights until the underlying technology is stale and unlikely to be of much use to accused 
infringers that independently developed the technology themselves years earlier”). 
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technology—into royalties.”160 To the extent that this is 
widespread activity, the prices set by this conduct threaten to 
pull patent values away from fundamentals and into the 
speculative range.161 
III. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Minsky predicts that some markets, which may begin in an 
ordered and self-regulating way, can become subject to 
incoherence.162 This circumstance can take hold even in markets 
that do not suffer from the lack of transparency and the other 
difficulties that exist in the buying and selling of patents. The 
prospect of an emerging patent market has the potential to 
operate according to rational economic principles. However, in its 
current state, it is difficult to predict whether rational economic 
assumptions will govern in fact, or whether incoherence will 
prevail. Moreover, it is not realistic to expect that the friction 
between rational patent monetizers, who develop strategies to 
maximize profit through arbitrage, will necessarily foster the 
optimal environment for invention and innovation. 
Whether patents or Bitcoins are subject to bubble behavior 
in fact remains to be seen. Like Bitcoin currency, patent 
monetization appears to lack sufficient objective tethers to 
rational fundamentals. Rather than speculative hoarding, patent 
monetizers use techniques that rely on timing, avoidance of high 
transaction costs, uncertainty, and target selection to maximize 
revenue. The most sophisticated patent entities focus on the 
acquisition and assertion of high-value patents portfolios within 
areas of vibrant and essential uses of patented technology, such 
as electronics, communication, and social networking.163 The 
private interests of monetizers, which seek to maximize 
individual profit, create friction with the social benefits that 
these technologies are designed to deliver. It may be that a 
transparent market will ultimately resolve these issues.  
 
 160 Letter from Noreen Krall, supra note 119, at 4; Microsoft Sues Acacia over 
Smartphone Patents, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/ 
11/20/us-microsoft-patents-idUSBRE9AJ14X20131120 (statement of David Howard, 
Microsoft’s deputy general counsel) (stating that patent monetizer Acacia Research Group 
is “attempting to extract payment based on litigation tactics and not the value of its 
patents”). 
 161 Comprehensive data is difficult to obtain because such agreements are frequently 
subject to confidentiality provisions. See generally Alan Schoenbaum, Hey Patent Trolls, 
the FTC Has a Few Questions for You, RACKSPACE (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.rack 
space.com/blog/hey-patent-trolls-the-ftc-has-a-few-questions-for-you/. 
 162  Minsky, supra note 3. 
 163 Cf. Wild, supra note 122, at 66–67 (describing a patent assertion entity’s 
preference to negotiate, rather than litigate). 
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Perhaps the most troubling aspect arises from a practice that 
mercerizes the violation of legal rights. In this context, future 
valuation will most likely be based on datasets accumulated 
during the current patent assertion climate.164 If current values 
are skewed from fundamentals, then future agreements will be 
based on unreliable measures. The “buy low, license high” 
practice may ultimately be vulnerable to the same flaw that 
triggers the end of all bubbles—that is, a lack of customers who 
are ready, willing, and able to pay license fees if monetization 
activity reaches an unsustainable level. Rates charged to “keep 
the bicycle moving forward to maintain momentum” will reach a 
limit as target company profits continue to be diverted to paying 
licensing fees. At a certain point in time, this practice will drive 
prices above the level that a sufficient number of licensees (and, 
ultimately, consumers) will pay.  
The patent royalty burden on innovators is not illusory. A 
recent paper estimates that the cost of the multiple patent 
royalties necessary to produce a $400 smartphone is $120, which 
is roughly equivalent to the cost of the components required to 
manufacture the phone, illustrates its operation.165 This study 
concludes, “the smartphone royalty stack across standardized 
and non-standardized technology is significant, and those costs 
may be undermining industry profitability.”166 As royalty 
demands rise, it can be expected that industry participants will 
become unwilling or unable to pay.167 The reason may be due to 
any number of factors, including an overloaded royalty stack, the 
innovator’s inability to obtain sufficient money to pay the rates 
charged, or a push against license prices driven primarily by 
arbitrage activity. Alternatively, innovation may slow as risk 
adverse innovators become reluctant to add new features that, if 
successful, result in high demands for patent royalties. 
 
 164 See, e.g., ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 872 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(stating that licenses deriving from litigation settlement are admissible when such 
licenses are the best available evidence of a patent’s value); Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP 
v. E-Z-EM, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-262(TJW), 2010 WL 774878, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2010) 
(“A prior, related settlement agreement, where it exists, may be central to the fact-finder’s 
determination of damages using a hypothetical negotiations analysis.”). 
 165 Ann Armstrong, Joseph J. Mueller & Timothy D. Syrett, The Smartphone Royalty 
Stack: Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components Within Modern Smartphones 2 
(May 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2443848. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Cf. Acacia Research Corp., Annual Report, supra note 115 (observing the potential 
negative impact on the company’s patent monetization business plan if economic, credit, 
or market conditions impact licensee’s ability or willingness to pay).  
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It may be that the patent system has been subject to policy 
bubble thinking.168 In part, this may be because the concept that 
“[a] strong intellectual property system supports and enables the 
innovation that is the lifeblood of our economy” is a 
well-engrained maxim among governmental decision makers.169 
That is, the patent system has benefited from a strong policy 
commitment. Yet there is a mounting literature, particularly 
among economists, that sheds doubt on the efficacy of patents to 
facilitate change.170 As one example, economist Adam Jaffe has 
concluded that there is a “disquieting” lack of evidence to support 
the proposition that stronger patent laws have any significant 
impact on innovation.171 However, to the degree that the 
valuation becomes swayed by patent monetization, which 
provides only weak support of knowledge creation, the credibility 
of the system may become impacted.  
Given the potential of royalty demands to chill socially 
valuable activity, some intervention may be possible to provide 
some guardrails on the prices that are the subject of private 
agreements. Certainly, providing clear and certain guidelines for 
patent valuation is one solution that might prevent speculators 
from driving the cost of patents either upward or downward. As 
one source asserts, “[T]he lack of transparent price signals 
 
 168 See supra Part I.C and accompanying text. 
 169 Press Release, The Whitehouse, Fact Sheet – Executive Actions: Answering the 
President’s Call to Strengthen Our Patent System and Foster Innovation, (Feb. 20, 2014), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/20/fact-sheet-executive-actions-answe 
ring-president-s-call-strengthen-our-p; see also, e.g., Special Message to the Congress 
Proposing Patent Modernization and Reform Legislation, 1973 PUB. PAPERS 825 (Sept. 27, 
1973) (observing that the nation’s “creative history” is based in part on the patent laws 
that have “enormously stimulated our progress and prosperity”); SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, 
TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF 
USEFUL ARTS: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, S. DOC. 
NO. 90-5, at iii (1967) (summarizing the committee’s conclusion that the patent system 
“continues to provide an essential incentive for the conduct of research and the 
investment of capital”); ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN. & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS, at i (2012), 
available at http://www.iprcenter.gov/reports/ipr-center-reports/intellectual-property-and-
the-u.s.-economy-industries-in-focus/ (“Protecting our ideas and IP promotes innovative, 
open, and competitive markets, and helps ensure that the U.S. private sector remains 
America's innovation engine.”). 
 170 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 141 (2008) (“[D]uring the late 
1990s, the aggregate costs of patents exceeded the aggregate private benefits of patents 
for United States public firms outside the chemical and pharmaceutical industries.”); 
Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 
2013, at 3, 7. 
 171 Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the 
Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL’Y 531, 540 (2000). 
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results in distorted and inconsistent incentives to produce and 
commercialize new ideas.”172 
To the extent that a bubble may be developing in the patent 
assertion area, one question is whether there is a secondary 
impact on investment that depends on the patent system to 
support research and development. Stated another way, if 
patents are viewed as too unpredictable to value, too volatile to 
incentivize investment, or too dependent on patent monetization 
entities for pricing norms, such a state of affairs may affect the 
market’s willingness to invest in the type of research and 
innovation that the patent system was intended to incentivize. 
Thus, a bursting of a patent bubble might have immediate 
second-order effects on the patent system more generally, or 
perhaps other forms of intellectual property.  
At a minimum, prices paid in the price assertion markets 
should be cabined from affecting royalty rates used as 
comparators in other areas of patent law. As one example, such 
prices should be strictly limited, if not eliminated, as a 
foundational support of expert testimony about established 
royalty rates for jury proceedings or for other areas of patent 
licensing practice. To the extent that patent assertion valuation 
swings, such safeguards would minimize the spillover effects in 
other areas of investment. To the extent that there is a rapid 
change in the monetization sector, safeguards should be in place 
to disconnect these effects from ties to other areas and to help 
preserve the patent’s system core role in incentivizing invention 
and innovation. 
 
 
 172 Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stern, Is There a Market for Ideas?, 19 INDUS. & CORP. 
CHANGE 805, 806 (2010). 
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